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Introduction
On January 12, 2010, a massive
earthquake struck Haiti, essentially
destroying the Haitian government
infrastructure. According to remarks by
Rene Magloire, former Minister of
Justice and Special Advisor to the
President and Ministry of Justice, the
presidential palace, the ministry of
justice building, and the legislative
palace were destroyed. Police stations
and prisons were damaged, allowing thousands of detainees and prisoners
to escape. More than 200 thousand died, more than 300 thousand were
injured, more than 450 thousand became refugees, more than 400 thousand
homes were destroyed, more than 120 thousand homes damaged, and more
than a million people were left without shelter.[1] For five years Magloire and
other justice officials had been working on re-establishing the Haitian judicial
system and the rule of law.
Earthquakes, tsunamis, and climate disruption have focused international
attention on environmental disasters, natural and anthropogenic, and the
ability of the global community to respond adequately and immediately. This
Insight surveys the structures for consensual relief efforts by states and the
United Nations, accepted international norms for humanitarian intervention in
environmental disasters, and how these norms might be modified by
international recognition of the responsibility to protect.
Consensual Relief Efforts
As early as 1991, the United Nations Environmental Program ("UNEP"), in
response to mounting disquietude over environmental security, established
the United Nations Center for Urgent Environmental Assistance ("UNCUEA")
to assess and respond to man-made environmental emergencies in
cooperation with other United Nations agencies. To address acute
environmental emergencies specifically, UNEP has now coordinated with the
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to
create the Joint UNEP/OCHA Environment Unit (JEU).[2] A month after the
earthquake in Haiti, John Holmes, the head of OCHA, wrote a confidential
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email to his top UN relief agency coordinators highly critical of the UN relief
efforts and weak implementation of its humanitarian "cluster strategy" for
delivering relief in twelve sectors of need, including water, health care, and
shelter.[3] He emphasized that "with the rainy season looming, these unmet
needs are taking on additional urgency, not least from the health and
protections points of view, and given the potential consequences in terms of
both politics and security of large demonstrations in some sensitive places."
He stated that there was an urgent need for better coordination "(1) to
ensure close coordination with the efforts of national authorities; (2) to
channel the contributions of the private sector; and (3) to make maximum
use of the logistical support and other assistance provided by the military."
In a natural disaster like that in Haiti, there are significant logistical problems
in coordination of UN and multilateral relief efforts, even with a totally
cooperative and consenting state. Legal problems are less significant with a
consenting state, as there is no need to justify relief efforts as lawful
"intervention." Providing relief assistance in an uncooperative or failed state,
however, may present legal problems. Even the Security Council is subject
to the Article 2(7) prohibition on intervention in states’ domestic jurisdiction
when it recommends relief assistance under Chapter VI.[4] If the state in
which the environmental problem originates is uncooperative, the Security
Council, instead of resorting to Chapter VII, might choose to issue
precautionary and ameliorative recommendations for emergency response
action applicable only in the territory of consenting states, but which could
nevertheless be interpreted by the state of origin as "intervention" in its
domestic jurisdiction. For example, routine monitoring or exchange of
information on the transboundary effects of an environmental disaster, taken
pursuant to a Security Council recommendation that there be such collection
and exchange of information, might be objectionable to the state of origin. In
this regard, it is relevant to note that Russian counter-intelligence agents in
1995 accused a "[w]estern ecological organization of divulging military
secrets and . . . suggested that foreign environmental groups are fronts for
espionage."[5]
Environmental disasters with transboundary effects, loss of a vital global
resource, or actions in violation of international environmental law may no
longer be regarded as matters of "domestic" jurisdiction. An interpretation of
"domestic" jurisdiction that excludes environmental disasters with
international ramifications is also consistent with the current widespread
recognition that "domestic" jurisdiction does not encompass large scale
deprivation of basic human rights. Otherwise even the most well intended
relief efforts by states or the UN might be characterized as unlawful
intervention in uncooperative or failed states.
Humanitarian Intervention
Even when working with a fully cooperative government in Haiti, the head of
UN relief operations has acknowledged a disturbing inadequacy of the UN to
provide and coordinate voluntary relief assistance. In the first critical hours
during the Haiti earthquake, or in the next environmental disaster, what
government is available to consent to such efforts? Do the international
community and the UN have to await consent from a state unable to
respond? The Security Council may authorize action without consent if there
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is a "threat to peace," and recent precedents of humanitarian intervention
and acknowledgment of refugee problems as a threat to peace may lend
themselves to invocation of Chapter VII, but not decisively so.
The legality of unilateral and multilateral humanitarian intervention by states
continues to be highly disputed, given the Charter limitation on states’ use of
force as "self-defense."[6] It would be difficult for a state to justify military
intervention in a natural disaster in another state as self-defense. Similarly,
"breach of peace, threat to peace, or an act of aggression" under Chapter VII
for purposes of Security Council authorization of enforcement measures
does not effortlessly lend itself to authorizing humanitarian intervention,
much less in natural disasters.
In the absence of real or threatened military conflict, can environmental
destruction be sufficient to trigger the Council’s Chapter VII powers? Is a
threat to ecological security a threat to international peace and security? The
Security Council has declared that non-military sources of instability in the
economic, humanitarian, and ecological fields may become a threat to peace
and security. Should environmental degradation threaten to lead to conflict
between states or take place in an ongoing military conflict, there would be
no need to resort to a separate notion of ecological security or humanitarian
intervention in order to trigger authority in the Security Council under
Chapter VII. Absent real or potential military conflict, however, there are
many conceivable scenarios in which the state of origin of an environmental
disaster might be unable or unwilling to cooperate with the Security Council
or other states (e.g., the Soviet Union during Chernobyl and Myammar after
the tsunami), thereby exacerbating the transboundary effects of an
environmental disaster and jeopardizing the lives of its own populace by
refusing to cooperate with the international community in remedial action.
Security Council enforcement action with respect to preservation of human
rights is analogous to Security Council enforcement action to protect
individuals from environmental catastrophes. For example, the humanitarian
mission to Somalia,[7] the economic sanctions and authorization of a
multinational force for Haiti in 1993,[8] the placement of relief operations in
Iraqi territory for the Kurdish population,[9] and the establishment of the
international criminal tribunals for Rwanda[10] and the former Yugoslavia[11]
are examples of humanitarian intervention by the Security Council in order to
remedy gross and systematic deprivation of human rights. Although each of
these precedents (with the notable exception of Haiti) can be legitimized by
pointing to the background conflicts present, such a position would ignore
the humanitarian justifications given in the relevant resolutions for the
Security Council’s actions. Notably, the political tension created by mass
migration of refugees has also been a factor in the Council’s invocation of
Chapter VII. These examples indicate that the Security Council members and
the global community are at least somewhat receptive to a policy-oriented,
constitutive approach to interpreting the Charter even when such
interpretation expands the obligations and duties of member states beyond
the original intent of the Charter.
Any analogy to the Security Council’s exercise of humanitarian intervention
under Chapter VII is complicated by the fact that, under international law,
there has yet to be clear and unequivocal recognition of a right to a safe and
healthful environment.[12] This lack of recognition is particularly troublesome
in that whatever authority the Security Council might have under Chapter VII,
the scope of its activities is confined by the stated purposes of the United
Nations in Article 1.[13] Article 1 explicitly mentions human rights as one of
the fundamental purposes of the United Nations. Absent a threat to military
peace and security, or recognition of the concept of ecological security,
legitimacy of any Security Council enforcement measures in responding to
natural disasters on humanitarian grounds will be attenuated so long as
there is no explicit and clear recognition of a fundamental right to a safe and
healthful environment.
The Responsibility to Protect
The gap between this periodic need for the international community to
intervene in a state’s management of environmental disasters and the
prohibition on intervention could be filled by an extension of a relatively new
norm to this situation. On September 16, 2005, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution recognizing the "responsibility
to protect".[14] The core of the responsibility to protect is that "[e]ach
individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity."[15]
The international community has the responsibility to use diplomatic,
humanitarian and other peaceful means, and if those fail, may take
"collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a
case-by-case basis" when "national authorities are manifestly failing to
protect their populations" from the four crimes.
A broader formulation of the responsibility to protect was included in the
2001 report, The Responsibility to Protect, from the International Commission
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS Report). It concludes that
"where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war,
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling
or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the
international responsibility to protect."[16] The elements of the responsibility
include the responsibility to prevent, react, and rebuild, with the single most
important priority being the responsibility to prevent.[17] The ICISS Report
also advises that military intervention is appropriate when there is "serious
and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or likely to occur," involving
large scale loss of life (whether from "deliberate state action, or state neglect
or inability to act, or a failed state situation") or large scale ethnic cleansing.
While the ICISS Report favors intervention through the UN Security Council
and General Assembly, it acknowledges the possibility of state intervention
in a "conscience-shocking" situation if the UN fails to address the situation in
a timely manner.
However, UN officials, including the Secretary-General, have been quick to
deny that the responsibility to protect applies to environmental crises.
From State Security to Human Security
Would the responsibility to protect, if accepted as a norm of international
law, alter the calculation by requiring the Security Council or states to act?
Ultimately, the difference between Chapter VII precedents, the UN
formulation of the responsibility to protect, and ICISS Report may be one of
affirmative obligation versus permissive authority, and timing. A natural
disaster, which results in massive loss of life and population displacement,
can be characterized as a "threat to peace" such that the Security Council
may authorize enforcement action. The Security Council would not have an
affirmative responsibility to protect, unless the situation deteriorates into the
commission of war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against
humanity. Under the ICISS formulation, states and the UN would have an
affirmative obligation to respond whenever a population is suffering serious
harm, and the UN would have an affirmative obligation to do so with military
force when there is a large scale loss of life, "actual or apprehended which is
the product of deliberate state action, neglect or inability to act, or a failed
state situation . . . ." Haiti, seeking to "rise from the ashes," in the words of
King Henri Christophe, the leader of the 1804 Haitian revolution, may provide
a litmus test for which approach, prevention or remediation, is to be the
international practice.[18]
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